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ARTICLES
ANONYMOUS JURIES: IN EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY
ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY* AND JONATHAN I. EDELSTEIN**
INTRODUCTION
Slightly more than twenty years ago in United States v.
Barnes,1 a federal trial judge in the Southern District of New
York empaneled the first fully anonymous jury in American his-
tory.2 This unprecedented measure, 3 undertaken by the court on
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Director, International
Criminal Law Center. J.S.D., Columbia University, 1976; LL.M., Columbia University,
1972; J.D., University of Buffalo, 1971; B.A., Queens College, 1968.
** J.D., Fordham University, 1997; B.A., John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1992.
This essay is dedicated, for the first and hopefully not the last time, to my flanc6e, Naomi
Rabinowitz.
1 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979). The trial in the Barnes case occurred in 1977. Id. at
133.
2 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 133 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that previously, only partially
anonymous juries had been empaneled on several occasions in Ninth Circuit during
1950's). See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1959) (requiring
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its own initiative without being requested by either the prosecu-
tor or defense, 4 began as a judicial fluke. Despite its origins, it
has had as profound an effect on the operation of the American
jury system as any number of solemn Supreme Court decisions.
The impact, to be sure, was not immediate. In the decade fol-
lowing Barnes, the empanelment of anonymous juries was not a
frequent occurrence. As recently as 1986, the use of such juries
was widely viewed as a practice peculiar to the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York. 5 In the last decade, however, the
use of anonymous juries has proliferated throughout the United
States.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken
on the topic, a majority of federal appellate jurisdictions and the
highest courts of several states have approved the empanelment
of nameless juries under certain circumstances. 6 Some commen-
tators and judges have gone so far as to call for the routine em-
panelment of anonymous juries in criminal cases 7 and even in
contentious civil cases.8 The use of anonymous juries, almost un-
juror to state district of residence but not exact address); Wagner v. United States, 264
F.2d 524, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1959) (empaneling partially anonymous jury); Hamer v. United
States, 259 F.2d 274, 276-80 (9th Cir. 1958) (withholding prospective juror's names and
addresses).
3 See Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: Jury Tampering
By Another Name, 9-Fall CRiM. JusT. 14, 14 (1994) (stating that "jury anonymity was un-
known to common law and to American jurisprudence in its first two centuries"); David
Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy
Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 24 (1997) (stating that empaneling of anonymous jury was
extremely uncommon before Barnes decision).
4 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 168 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
5 See Eric Wertheim, Anonymous Juries, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 982 (1986) (de-
scribing anonymous jury as procedure which has "occasionally been used in New York
federal courts."); see also United States v. PepsiCo, 621 F. Supp. 842, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(discussing infrequency of Second Circuit empanelment of anonymous juries); State v.
Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Minn. 1995) (announcing framework to determine if
anonymous jury violates constitutional right to fair trial by burdening presumption of
innocence).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (arguing thatjury empanelment is drastic and should only be used under specific circumstances);
United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (delineating criteria court
should employ before empaneling anonymous jury); Jodene Jensen, Minnesota's First
Anonymous Jury, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 133, 136-40 (1996) (discussing empanelment
of anonymous juries in state courts).
7 See Catherine Gewertz, Judge Halts His Blanket Use of Anonymity in Bellflower,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995, at A3 (stating that following appellate court decision, Califor-
nia Senate narrowly rejected bill allowing trial judges to exercise greater discretion in
empaneling anonymous juries); see also Carl Ingram, Bill to Ensure Anonymity of Jurors
is Killed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at A3 (noting that legislation allowing jurors in
criminal trials to serve anonymously was voted down in California).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Real Property Known as 77 East 3rd Street, 849 F. Supp.
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thinkable in an American court even thirty years ago, is now
touted as a panacea for everything from jury tampering to "juror
stress,"9 and threatens to alter the very concept of voir dire. 10
A number of states, however, have rejected or highly restricted
the empanelment of anonymous juries on the grounds that they
impair the presumption of innocence, 11 threaten the integrity of
the judicial system, 12 and impermissibly narrow the scope of voir
dire. 13 Among these states are Massachusetts, 14 New Jersey, 15
and, until recently, New York. 16
At first glance, the empanelment of nameless juries would ap-
pear impossible in New York, a state which unlike the majority
of state and federal jurisdictions, grants criminal defendants and
their counsel a statutory right to learn the names and addresses
876, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (involving civil forfeiture proceeding of real property owned by
Hell's Angels motorcycle gang). But see Weinstein, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that ano-
nymity has rarely been employed in civil trials).
9 See generally Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of
Anonymous Juries in Criminal Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 126-29 (1996) (discussing
anonymous juries as remedy for juror's fears); Daniel W. Shuman, The Health Effects of
Jury Service, 18 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 267, 268-72 (1994).
10 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 168-173 (2d Cir. 1979) (Meskill, J., dis-
senting) (arguing trial court allowed too much discretion in determining best method of
voir dire). For states that have adopted the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, 13
U.L.A. 437, 455 (West 1986), see COLO.REV.STAT. 13-71-110(5) (Bradford 1998); 10
DEL.C. § 4513 (Michie 1990); HAW.REV.STAT. §§ 612-18 & 27 (Michie 1997); ID.CODE § 2-
210(5) (Michie 1998); IND.CODE ANN. 33-4-5.5-12(6) (West 1996); MD.CTS. &
JUD.PROC.CODE ANN. § 8-202(3) (Michie 1997); 14 ME.REV.STAT.ANN. § 1254-A (West
1998); MINN.STAT.ANN. § 593.42 subd.5 (West 1998); MISS.CODE ANN. § 13-5-32 (Law-
yer's Co-op 1992); N.D.CODE 27-09.1-09 (Michie 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-46- 13(5) (Mi-
chie 1996).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985) (addressing issue
of whether use of anonymous jury unconstitutionally infringed upon presumption of in-
nocence).
12 See State v. Accetturo, 619 A.2d 272, 274 (N.J. 1992) (describing threat to honesty
of judicial system posed by curative instruction).
13 See Toney v. State, 783 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. App. 1990) (recognizing difference
between small town and big city juries and impact on attorneys arguing before them); see
also Gannett Inc. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 757 (Del. 1990) (Walsh, J. dissenting) (proposing
that anonymity of jury gives rise to implication that defendant is dangerous); Common-
wealth v. DuPont, available in 1998 WL 559694, at * 14 (describing manner in which voir
dire was limited by anonymity).
14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 170-75 (Mass. 1993) (finding
that withholding of identities of jurors without cautionary instruction was sufficient ba-
sis for granting new trial); DuPont, 1998 WL 559694, at *11 (finding trial court had no
reason to empanel anonymous jury).
15 See, e.g., State v. Acetturo, 619 A.2d 272, 273-75 (N.J. 1992) (finding difficult to
believe that court may instruct in way that will not impair jury's perception of defen-
dant).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 168-173 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming
lower court's empanelment of anonymous jury).
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of potential jurors. 17 In People v. Watts, 18 however, a 1997 deci-
sion rendered during the trial of a reputed organized crime fig-
ure, a New York trial court suggested that defendants might for-
feit that right through acts of past or present misconduct.' 9
Although an anonymous jury ultimately was not empaneled in
Watts,20 the court's reasoning left open the possibility that a
New York trial judge might do so in the future without the need
for legislative action.
Accordingly, this article will examine the history and future of
anonymous juries in the United States and in New York. Part I
of this essay will discuss the Second Circuit's decision in Barnes
and its progeny, and trace the growing acceptance of nameless
juries. Part II will analyze the factors which counsel hesitation
in the use of anonymous juries, the majority of which have re-
ceived scant discussion in judicial and academic forums. Part III
will examine the Richmond County Supreme Court's decision in
Watts, and discuss whether it constitutes legitimate and suffi-
cient authority for future New York courts to withhold the
names of potential jurors. Finally, this article will suggest a
standard which strikes an adequate balance between the rights
of the accused and the need to protect the integrity of the jury
system.
I. FROM UNTHINKABLE TO UNASSAILABLE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
ANONYMOUS JURIES
The trial of Leroy "Nicky" Barnes was one of the first modern
organized crime megatrials. 21 Leroy "Nicky" Barnes, the reputed
boss of what was then the largest drug trafficking network in
Harlem, was arrested in 1977 and tried with 14 co-defendants on
numerous counts of conspiracy, violation of narcotics laws, and
weapons possession. The government's case against Barnes and
his cohorts depended largely on the testimony of various cooper-
ating informants. 22
Prior to trial, several events occurred which raised questions
17 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 270.15(1)(a) (McKinney 1998).
18 661 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1997).
19 See id. at 772.
20 See id.
21 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979).
22 See id. at 130-33.
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as to the potential for harm to prosecution witnesses and jurors.
At pretrial proceedings, the office of the United States Marshals,
who had custody of a Government informant by the name of
Robert Geronimo, reported the receipt of an anonymous phone
call allegedly threatening that "[i]f he [Geronimo] does anything,
he'll be dead."23 On the eve of trial, another potential witness
was in fact found dead. Shepard Franklin, a reputed Barnes' as-
sociate, was found murdered at a "site of much of the [drug] traf-
ficking in [the Barnes] case."'24
Although no threats, direct or otherwise, had been made
against potential jurors in the Barnes trial, the prosecution
moved to sequester the jury on the grounds of significant danger
to their safety and integrity. 25 Rather than grant the Govern-
ment's motion, the trial judge employed an entirely unprece-
dented measure: He prohibited the disclosure of the names, ad-
dresses and religious and ethnic backgrounds of potential
jurors.26 In fact, the trial court ruled that defense attorneys and
prosecutors would not even be informed of the neighborhood in
which each member of the jury panel lived; they would be limited
in their inquiry to the potential juror's county of residence.
Not only did the trial judge empanel an anonymous jury, but
he largely foreclosed litigation of the issue at the trial level.27
He did not solicit the views of the United States Attorney on his
proposed method of jury selection, and "every time counsel for
the defendants sought to challenge the district court's ruling, ei-
ther orally or in writing, their requests were sharply denied."28
In sum, the trial court empaneled the United States' first fully
anonymous jury without the guidance of prior case law or the
parties themselves. 29
23 Id. at 136.
24 Id. at 137 n.7 (noting that night before trial began, Shepard Franklin, reputed
Barnes' associate, was found murdered at location where much of Barnes' drug traffick-
ing occurred).
25 See id. at 135 n.3 (noting other examples of high-profile criminal cases to illustrate
what could occur in present case).
26 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 168 n.1 (noting that trial court ordered that defense at-
torneys and prosecutors not be informed of neighborhood in which each juror lived, but
allowed limited inquiry as to potential juror's county of residence).
27 See id. at 169 (noting that judge did not solicit views of United States Attorney on
anonymous jury selection; "every time counsel for the defendants sought to challenge the
district court's ruling, either orally or in writing, their requests were sharply denied").
28 Id.
29 See id.
1999]
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After a lengthy jury selection process, 30 the trial of Barnes and
his cohorts began on September 29, 1977.31 After three days of
deliberations, 11 of the 15 defendants, including Barnes, were
convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from fifteen
years to life.32
On appeal, the primary issue raised by the defendants was the
selection and empanelment of an anonymous jury.33 The defen-
dants contended that the court's failure to disclose the names,
addresses and ethnic backgrounds of potential jurors was an im-
permissible infringement on the voir dire. 34 Over a scathing dis-
sent by Judge Meskill, 35 the Second Circuit upheld the procedure
in an opinion which encapsulates the arguments which have
been raised in support of the empanelment of anonymous juries.
The Second Circuit began its analysis by noting that a trial
judge generally has broad discretion in conducting the voir
dire. 36 Thus, the court stated that the purpose of the voir dire
was to ascertain disqualifications, rather than affording deep
analysis of individual parties to ensure that a jury "fits into some
mold ... believe[d] [to be] appropriate for [a] case. ' 37 In keeping
with this principle, the Second Circuit also stated that "the Con-
stitution does not always entitle a defendant to have questions
posed during voir dire specifically directed to matters that con-
ceivably might prejudice veniremen against him. ' 38 In conclu-
sion, the majority in Barnes held that "[a]s long as there is some
questioning as to identifiable issues connected in some way with
persons, places or things likely to arise during the trial, an ap-
30 See id. at 135-36 (noting that more than 150 potential jurors were questioned by
trial court, and prosecuting and defense attorneys).
31 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 133.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 134.
34 See id. Specifically, the defendants cited the famous passage from Darrow's article,
Attorney for the Defense, in which the legendary trial attorney contended that a juror's
"nationality, his business, religion, politics, social standing, family ties, friends, habits of
life and thought; the books and newspapers he likes and reads... [even to his] method of
speech, the kind of clothes he wears, the style of haircut..." were proper subjects for voir
dire. Id.
35 See id. at 168-74 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (arguing that trial court's decision to not
release juror's names, addresses, ethnic and religious background denied defense mean-
ingful application of peremptory challenge).
36 See id. at 137 (citing Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931)).
37 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 138 (citing Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738(1st Cir. 1967)).
38 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 138 n.8 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594
(1976)).
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pellate court faced with a cold record should be satisfied that jus-
tice has been done." 39
Based upon this reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded that
the empanelment of an anonymous jury did not unconstitution-
ally restrict the scope of the defendants' voir dire. 40 Moreover,
the court held that the nondisclosure of potential jurors' names,
addresses and ethnic and religious backgrounds was justified by
the threat of jury tampering and media harassment of jurors. 4 1
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit cited three prior
instances in which jurors in the Southern District of New York
had reportedly been bribed or intimidated, 42 and speculated that
media accounts at the time of the trial had increased the fears of
jurors by incorrectly reporting that threats had been delivered by
the defendants. 43 According to the Barnes majority, anonymity
removed pressure from the trial jury and fostered impartiality. 44
The Second Circuit's holding represented the fulfillment of
Judge Friendly's prophecy delivered 15 years earlier in United
States v. Borelli,45 in which he stated that confirmed threats to
jurors "[demonstrated] the need for precautions assuring that
the addresses, and perhaps even the names, of jurors in cases
such as this will be held in confidence." 46 In Barnes, the Second
Circuit turned possibility into reality, stating that "the time has
come to approve the precautions suggested in Borelli.' '47 In fact,
the Barnes court exceeded the rationale of Borelli, concluding
that no actual threats were required for such judicial action
where the circumstances suggested profound disruption of the
39 See id. at 139.
40 See id. at 142-43 ('Since the court gave counsel full opportunity for an intelligent
exercise of challenges by inquiring into the essentials of the case at hand, appellants
were not deprived of any trial right which would require a new trial.").
41 See id. at 135-37 (discussing past instances of jury tampering and media irrespon-
sibility); see also id. at 140-42 (addressing issue of jurors' fears).
42 See id. at 135 n.3. It is noteworthy that jury tampering was not actually proved in
any of these cases. Id.
43 See id. at 136-37 (describing incorrect statements made by press).
44 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 140-41. The court noted that "[ilf a juror feels that he or
his family may be subjected to violence or death at the hands of a defendant or his
friends, how can his judgment be as free and impartial as the Constitution requiresT' Id.
45 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964) (supporting actions taken by Trial Court).
46 Id. at 392 (discussing need for precautions for jury safety where confirmed threats
to their safety exist and noting that "the time has come to approve the precautions sug-
gested in Borelli").
47 Barnes, 604 F.2d at 141.
1999]
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trial.48 In the face of the increasing dangers associated with or-
ganized crime and narcotics cases, 49 even the possibility of jury
tampering was enough.
The Second Circuit permanently established anonymous juries
in federal criminal jurisprudence by denying the defendants' pe-
tition for a rehearing. 50 In a prophetic dissent, Judge Oakes fore-
told the powerful precedential impact of the majority holding
upon narcotics cases: "[J]udges in other narcotics cases are sure
to follow its precedent as, to borrow a simile of Judge Tibers, a
flock of seagulls follows a lobster boat."51 In the two decades
since the Barnes decision, Judge Oakes' prophecy has been more
than fulfilled.
Courts since Barnes have sanctioned the use of anonymous ju-
ries in narcotics cases, as well as a wide range of cases involving
organized crime, homicide or widespread publicity.52 Indeed, the
use of anonymous juries in certain cases has become almost rou-
tine. Although the Second Circuit has held that "the invocation
of the words 'organized crime,' 'mob,' or 'mafia,' without some-
thing more, do not warrant use of an anonymous jury,"53 the fed-
eral courts have in practice concluded that "something more" is
present in virtually every organized crime case. 54
In recent years, an increasing number of state as well as fed-
48 See id. ("It will not do to say that, because there were no actual threats received in
the case at bar, [the trial court's] action was inappropriate, for the circumstances were
such that the suggestion of disruption was manifest.").
49 See id. at 141-142 (describing increasing dangers of narcotic prosecutions).
50 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 175 (denying rehearing en banc).
51 See id. (Oakes, J., dissenting).
52 See, e.g., State v. Bowldes, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995) (using anonymous jury in
trial of accused murderer of police officer); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155,
171 (Mass. 1993) (empaneling anonymous jury in racketeering case). See generally Abra-
ham Abramovsky, Anonymous Juries, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1993, at 3 (explaining recent
decisions to empanel anonymous juries in various types of cases); Michael Miller, Trial
Starts in Los Angeles Riot Beating Case, REUTERS NORTH AMERICAN WIRE, July 28, 1993
(noting that completely anonymous jury empaneled in trial regarding brutal beating of
Reginald Denny during 1992 Los Angeles riots following Rodney King verdict); Eleanor
Randolph, Four Guilty in Bombing of World Trade Center: Angry Outburst in Courtroom
Follows Verdict, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1994, at Al (noting that four accused of bombing
World Trade Center were convicted by anonymous jury).
53 See United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining ties to or-
ganized crime are not sufficient to justify jury empanelment).
54 See United States v. Gambino, 809 F.Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding
that defendant's reputed membership in Gambino organized crime family, an organiza-
tion with history of attempting to interfere with judicial process, was sufficient to war-
rant empanelment of anonymous jury); see also Abraham Abramovsky, Don't Mask Ju-
ries, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at 56 (discussing recent trend toward empanelingjuries in organized crime cases).
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eral jurisdictions have accepted the use of anonymous juries. 55
In some cases, in fact, state courts have empaneled nameless ju-
ries under even broader circumstances than the federal courts
have thus far been willing to sanction. For instance, while the
Fifth Circuit recently held that an anonymous jury was not war-
ranted in the case of a non-organized crime defendant charged
with civil rights violations, 56 California trial judges have ex-
perimented with juror anonymity in misdemeanor cases. 57 The
call for universal empanelment of anonymous juries has recently
been taken up by at least one legal scholar, who argues that "ju-
ror stress" alone, even without particularized threats to the
safety or integrity of the jury, is enough to warrant anonymity. 58
Thus, in the space of twenty short years, nameless juries have
progressed from a judicial fluke to a well-established departure
from ordinary procedure, and a measure which some authorities
argue seriously should be ordinary procedure.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANONYMOUS JURIES
Unlike the arguments in favor of juror anonymity, the argu-
ments against anonymous juries have received scant attention
by courts or legal scholars. 59 Many judges, especially in federal
jurisdictions, have become almost cavalier in granting motions to
55 See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1532 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding trial
court did not err by empanelling anonymous jury in appropriate circumstances); United
States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1090-91 (D.C.Cir. 1995) (finding empanelment of
anonymous jury valid); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519-22 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding anonymous jury valid); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1216 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding use of anonymous jury by trial court legitimate based upon defendant's
history of violence including murder of potential witness); United States v. Paccione, 949
F.2d 1183, 1193 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding empanelment of anonymous jury on grounds of
defendant's strong ties to organized crime). See generally Georgia Sargeant, Criminal
Defense Lawyers Protest Increased Use of Nameless Jurors, TRIAL, Sept. 1994, at 112
(noting that practice of empaneling anonymous juries has become widespread in federal
and state courts).
56 See United States v. Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating there was
no defined juror threat); see also United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir.
1995) (calling anonymous jury empanelment drastic measure).
57 See Catherine Gewertz, Courthouse Makes Blanket Use of Juror Anonymity, L.A.
Times, July 25, 1994, at Al (discussing recent jury empanelment and hesitancy to util-
ize).
58 See generally King, supra note 9, at 137 (suggesting anonymity lessens general
fears of retaliation, exposure, and intimidation); Shuman, supra note 9, at 268 (describ-
ing research from recent studies indicating high juror stress).
59 See id. Moreover, the majority of the instances in which the arguments against
nameless juries have been noted are court decisions or articles in which these arguments
have been merely mentioned or given lip service before being dismissed. Id.
1999]
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empanel anonymous juries in cases with even a remote link to
narcotics or organized crime. Nonetheless, the case against juror
anonymity is compelling and implicates the highest values and
traditions of the American justice system.60 The most striking
argument against nameless juries, however, is purely practical.
Simply put, anonymous juries are unnecessary and fail to serve
their purpose.
The historical record demonstrates the lack of necessity for ju-
ror anonymity. In the 200-year history of the American justice
system, there are few if any instances in which jurors have been
injured, and none in which a juror has been killed, as a result of
his service on a jury.61 Moreover, the trials of many notorious
organized crime figures, including Al Capone, 62 "Lucky" Lu-
ciano63 and Murder, Inc.'s Louis "Lepke" Buchalter 64 were all
successfully undertaken without the use of anonymous juries. 65
In each of these cases, the names and addresses of jurors were
read aloud in open court, and in none of them was any juror
harmed. 66 It is doubtful that any modern-day organized crime
figure would be more dangerous to his enemies-or to jurors-than
the legendary Capone or Luciano.
Furthermore, anonymous juries are an inadequate remedy
against the threat of jury tampering. This is amply illustrated
by the federal and state trials of Gambino family boss, John
Gotti.67 At Gotti's first federal trial, the anonymous jury was
corrupted when a juror with ties to organized crime figures con-
60 See generally Eva M. Rodriguez, Anonymous Juries: More Common, Controversial,
LEGAL TIMES, May 1994, at 1 (exercising peremptory challenges is difficult when there is
lack of juror information).
61 See Abraham Abramovsky, The Choices Surrounding Use of Anonymous Juries,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 1993, at 3.
62 See Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1932).
63 See People v. Luciano, 14 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 1938).
64 See Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1973).
65 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 175 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., dissent-
ing from denial of petition for rehearing en banc); see also Buchalter, 319 U.S. at 429;
Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1932); People v. Luciano, 14 N.E.2d 433
(1938).
66 See Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427 (1973) (holding no threat of harm existed
toward jury in murder trial of Louis Lepke Buchalter); United States v. Costello, 255
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding no threat to jury tax evasion case); Capone v. United
States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1932) (holding no potential or actual threat to jury in tax
evasion trial of reputed mobster); People v. Luciano, 14 N.E.2d 433 (1938) (holding no
threat of harm to jury in trial of reputed mob boss for prostitution ring).
67 See United States v. Gotti, 784 F.Supp. 1013, 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); People v.
Gotti, 552 N.Y.S.2d. 485, 485 (1990).
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tacted Gotti's defense team on his own initiative. 68 In addition,
Gotti's 1990 trial for assault in a New York State court was pos-
sibly corrupted, but the tampering which may have occurred in
that case was not of the kind which could have been prevented
by anonymity. Rather Gotti had more direct access to the jurors,
namely that the police officer who guarded them during delibera-
tions was on the Gambino family payroll.69 The Gotti trials pro-
vide more than sufficient proof that anonymity will not stop a re-
sourceful organized crime figure from tampering with a jury. 70
Another example of the ineffectiveness of anonymity in pro-
tecting the identities of jurors was provided by federal prosecu-
tor's recent motion for an anonymous jury in the Abner Louima
case.7 1 In that motion, the Government requested an anonymous
jury due in part to the alleged prior misconduct of Lester Levine,
a private investigator employed by one of the defendants. 72 Spe-
cifically, federal prosecutors charged that Levine had discovered
the identities of jurors in a prior trial and investigated their
backgrounds, despite a court order protecting the jurors' ano-
nymity.73 Moreover, prosecutors also alleged that Levine uncov-
ered the identity of a juror who was excused during trial and in-
terviewed him concerning the ongoing discussion of the case in
the jury room. 74
It is thus apparent that anonymity has not proven to be an ef-
fective procedure in guaranteeing the privacy of trial jurors
against a determined defendant. In fact, in another organized
crime trial that occurred in Florida, the defendant's associates
68 See JERRY CAPECI & GENE MUSTAIN, GoTTI: RISE AND FALL 173-75 (1996).
69 See id. at 328-44.
70 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §§ 215.19; 215.20; 215.25. In addition, in many jurisdictions,
a defendant has little to lose by engaging in jury tampering. In New York, for example,
jury tampering is at most a Class D felony and in some cases is only a misdemeanor. Id.
Thus, a defendant facing serious felony charges has every incentive to tamper with the
judicial process. It would seem that upgrading of jury tampering to a more serious felony
offense would be a far greater deterrent to potential tamperers than would juror ano-
nymity.
71 See Joseph P. Fried, Prosecutors in Louima Case Want to Keep Jurors Anonymous,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999, at B3.
72 See id.
73 See United States' Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for an Anony-
mous and Partially Sequestered Jury, in United States v. Volpe, CR-98-196 (E.D.N.Y.),
dated February 1, 1999, at 11. The trial in which Mr. Levine was alleged to have im-
properly breached the anonymity of jurors was the "cyber-rape" trial of Oliver Jovanovic.
Id.
74 See id.
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obtained the identity of an anonymous juror and posted his
name, address, personal data and criminal record on the World
Wide Web. 75 Thus, in purely practical terms, anonymous juries
do not fulfill their goal of preventing intimidation, harassment or
bribery of jurors.
In addition to these practical objections to the use of anony-
mous juries, several other effects of juror anonymity strike at the
very heart of the American criminal justice system. While the
most powerful of these is the effect of nameless juries on the pre-
sumption of innocence, anonymity also threatens judicial integ-
rity76 and the ability of both defense attorneys and prosecutors
to fully investigate jurors for possible bias or interest.
A. Presumption of Innocence
The presumption of innocence, while not specifically mandated
in the Constitution, is an "axiomatic norm" of the American
criminal justice system. 77 The importance of the presumption of
innocence in the Anglo-American legal tradition78 is clearly evi-
denced by the fact that courts have traditionally been reluctant
to infringe upon it. In cases where it was deemed necessary to
compromise the presumption of innocence, courts have tradition-
ally applied a balancing test, weighing the magnitude of the
stigma to the defendant against the magnitude and urgency of
the threat to the criminal justice system. 79 This balancing test
75 See United States v. Ippolito, 10 F. Supp.2d 1305, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (stating
that third parties "have learned Juror 505's full name, home address, place of employ-
ment, social security number, Florida driver's license number, telephone numbers, auto-
mobile registration data, and other personal information useful in locating and contact-
ing Juror 505" and posted information on Internet).
76 See Jerry Capeci, Justice Imperiled When Judges Lie, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 24,
1993, at 14 (stating such action on part of judiciary has been noticed by tabloid media).
77 See Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993) (noting that presumption of inno-
cence is fundamental to fair trial although not specifically provided for in Constitution);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) ("Without question, the presumption of inno-
cence plays an important role in our criminal justice system."); Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ('CThe presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.");
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a presump-
tion of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary,
and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.").
78 See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that court in Thomas recognized "cen-
trality of the presumption of innocence in American criminal law").
79 See, e.g., United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1132 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that
reasonable precaution must be taken to minimize effect such decision might have on ju-
rors' opinion of defendants); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 (2d Cir. 1985)
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was specifically applied in United States v. Melendez,80 which
concluded that a trial judge must "carefully consider the degree
of prejudice to the defendant weighed against the magnitude of
threat to the jurors."81
The eviscerating effect of juror anonymity upon the presump-
tion of innocence has been noted even by those courts which have
made use of anonymous juries.82 For instance, in United States
v. Ross,83 the Eleventh Circuit noted that juror anonymity
"raises the specter that the defendant is a dangerous person
from whom the jurors must be protected, thereby implicating the
defendant's constitutional right to a presumption of innocence." 84
Proponents of juror anonymity, however, have used a variety of
arguments to contend that the Melendez balancing test should be
interpreted to permit the empanelment of nameless juries in a
wide variety of circumstances.
Some advocates of anonymous juries, have argued that the
magnitude of the stigma placed upon defendants by anonymous
juries has been greatly exaggerated and furthermore cannot be
accurately determined.85 At least one court has agreed that
"predicting juror responses to the anonymity practice is pure
speculation," and thus declined to weigh the issue heavily as a
factor against the empanelment of an anonymous jury.86 Advo-
cates of anonymous juries have, in fact, argued that the practice
of anonymity is not damaging to the presumption of innocence
because in dispelling jurors' irrational fears, it "serves [the] ideal
(stating court must balance government's interest in safeguarding jurors against defen-
dants interest in avoiding erosion presumption of innocence); United States v. Melendez,
743 F.Supp. 134, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that trial judge must "carefully consider
the degree of prejudice to the defendant weighed against the magnitude of threat to thejurors").
80 743 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
81 Id. at 137.
82 See Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1363 (empanelling of jury must receive strict scrutiny).
See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1376 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating empanelling
anonymous jury has serious implications for defendants interest in maintaining pre-
sumption of innocence).
83 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994).
84 See id. at 1519; see also Abraham Abramovsky, The Choices Surrounding Use of
Anonymous Juries, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1993, at 3 (arguing anonymity of jury imperils pre-
sumption of innocence by creating implication of guilt).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Edmond, 730 F.Supp. 1144, 1150 (D.D.C. 1995) (con-
cluding that "the defendant's assumption that anti-defendant bias is the only possible, or
even the most likely, reaction is suspect").
86 See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1026 (3d Cir. 1988) ('Predicting juror
responses to the anonymity practice is pure speculation.").
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of dispassionate judgment."87
Proponents of nameless juries also argue strongly in favor of
the mitigating effect of curative instructions on the stigma
caused by anonymity.8 8 Furthermore, they contend that the
prejudice to the defendant is further minimized by the trial
court's specific charge to the jury regarding the presumption of
innocence. Instead, advocates of juror anonymity believe that ju-
rors who have been so instructed "will abide by the court's in-
structions and will presume the defendants innocent until the
prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element
of the crimes with which the defendants are charged."89
Proponents of jury anonymity have also argued in favor of the
routine empanelment of anonymous juries, contending that the
stigma caused by the empanelment of nameless juries in specific
cases would be vitiated if jurors were kept anonymous in all
cases. 90 This argument has been used even by some who are not
in favor of anonymous juries. At least one defense attorney has
argued that if anonymous juries are to be empaneled at all, they
should be empaneled in every case in order to avoid singling out
particular defendants as dangerous.91
The contention that juror anonymity poses no danger to the
presumption of innocence is, to say the least, disingenuous. The
failure of curative instructions to prevent prejudice to the defen-
dant has been amply demonstrated. Furthermore, although trial
courts instruct anonymous juries concerning the presumption of
innocence as a matter of course, prosecutors have compromised
87 See King, supra note 9, at 142 (arguing that jury empanelment does not impair
ability of jury to arrive at sensible decision).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1533 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that prejudice to defendant had been minimized by trial court's instruction to jurors that
they were being kept anonymous to protect them from media exposure); United States v.
Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1193 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding curative instructions to jury ade-
quate).
89 See United States v. Edmond, 730 F.Supp. 1144, 1151 (D.D.C. 1995).
90 See King, supra note 9, at 145-46 ("Granting juror anonymity routinely, rather
than upon proof of a real risk to juror safety, would remove the stigma of guilt that selec-
tive anonymity carries."); see also Gewertz, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that California
judge believes that "withholding jurors' names in every case, regardless of its nature,
eliminates.. .bias" against defendant); Stephanie Simon, Judges Advocate Bill to Keep
Juries Anonymous, L.A_ TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, at B1 (discussing California Judicial Coun-
cil's announced plan to study juror anonymity as part of project to improve juries).
91 See King, supra note 9, at 134 (arguing automatic jury empanelment eliminates
possibility that jurors will be suspicious of defendants); Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24
AM. J. CRIM. L. 63, 98 (1996) (suggesting jurors are prejudiced when empanelment is not
routine).
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this presumption and controverted the instruction by stating, in
open court, their reasons for requesting an anonymous jury.92 If
a statement that a defendant is "a murderous and treacherous
crime boss," about whom jurors "would be less than human if
[they] did not feel some concern"93 is not damaging to the pre-
sumption of innocence, it is difficult to fathom a statement that
would be. Consequently, even if trial courts are thorough about
minimizing the prejudice to a defendant as a result of juror ano-
nymity, prosecutors are able and willing to use the empanelment
of an anonymous jury as a means of stigmatizing the accused.
This devastating effect on the presumption of innocence was
recognized by the highest court of Massachusetts in Common-
wealth v. Angiulo,94 which recognized that empanelment of
anonymous juries can implicate rights of constitutional dimen-
sion. 95 Specifically, the Angiulo court held that "[t]he empanel-
ment of an anonymous jury triggers due process scrutiny because
this practice is likely to taint the jurors' opinion of the defendant,
thereby burdening the presumption of innocence." 96 The court
required the trial judge to make a determination warranting
anonymity based upon adequate evidence sufficient to satisfy the
due process before such a jury may be empaneled.97
This necessity analysis, as the Angiulo court noted, is essential
to satisfying even the minimal standards of due process. 98
Based on this rationale alone, routine empanelment of anony-
mous juries should be found to violate constitutional norms.
Moreover, despite the arguments of its proponents, routine juror
92 See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 6 F.3d 924, 946 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting closing
statement of U.S. Attorney Andrew Maloney stated that defendant was "murderous and
treacherous crime boss" about whom jurors "would be less than human if [they] did not
feel some concern," is not damaging to the presumption of innocence, it would be difficult
to find statement that is).
93 See United States v. Gotti, 6 F.3d 924, 946 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting closing statement
of prosecuting United States Attorney Andrew Maloney).
94 615 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. 1993).
95 See id. at 170-75 ("The empanelment of an anonymous jury triggers due process
scrutiny because this practice is likely to taint the jurors' opinion of the defendant,
thereby burdening the presumption of innocence.").
96 See id. at 171.
97 See Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1363 (applying strict scrutiny and determining that "no
anonymous jury is to be empaneled... unless the trial judge has first determined on ade-
quate evidence that anonymity is truly necessary. .. [because] the due process clause re-
quires that reasonable precautions be taken to minimize the effect of the jurors' ano-
nymity on their perception of the defendant:').
98 See id. at 1365.
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anonymity would not eliminate the damage to the presumption
of innocence. Although the stigma of anonymity would be re-
duced if it were not seen as an extraordinary measure, such a
stigma would still exist; any gain would be more than offset by
the loss from its intrusion into all criminal cases. In fact, routine
anonymity would simply categorize all criminal defendants in
one class: Menacing persons from whom jurors need to be pro-
tected. 99 Given that the harm to the presumption of innocence
would not be eliminated by routine anonymity, the Due Process
Clause should be interpreted to preclude such a measure except
in the unlikely event that anonymity is found to be "truly neces-
sary" in all cases.
B. Integrity of the Judicial System
Another critical threat posed by anonymous juries springs di-
rectly from judicial attempts to contain their damaging effect
upon the presumption of innocence. In an attempt to alleviate
the severe stigma imposed upon a defendant on trial before an
anonymous jury, courts have issued a variety of supposedly cura-
tive instructions to the jurors. 100 In many cases, these instruc-
tions involve the concealment from the jury of the real reason
why their identities have not been revealed. 101 For instance, a
99 See Gewertz, supra note 57, at Al (quoting defense attorney Terrence Kirk who
stated that "if you deny the presumption of innocence across the board ... it just means
the defense suffers in every case because it creates the idea that defendants are a class to
be feared").
100 See, e.g. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d Cir. 1985).
101 See id. The Thomas court considered the circumstances surrounding the case as
supporting the trial judge's decision to empanel an anonymous jury explaining that the
defendants were allegedly dangerous persons who had engaged in large scale "mob-style"
killings. Id. In light of this, and other significant facts, the judge decided to empanel the
jury. Id. However, the instruction to the jury did not reflect these concerns. Id. In fact
the judge told the jury:
Now this should be a very interesting case. Undoubtedly, it could receive consider-
able publicity, newspaper, radio and television. The media and the public may be cu-
rious concerning the identity of the participants, the witnesses, the lawyers and the
jurors. That curiosity and its resultant comments might come to the attention of the
jury selected here and possibly impair its impartiality by viewpoints expressed,
comments made, opinions, inquiries and so forth. Now, such outside influences could
tend to distort what goes on in court, the evidence, and be distracting and divert the
attention of the jury, and it might result in people prying into personal affairs of the
participants, including those selected as jurors, who are selected only to judge the
evidence in the case that can legally come before you, and thus to distort and distract
attention from the case. Consequently, taking into consideration all the circum-
stances, I have decided that in selecting those who will serve as the jury your name,
your address and your place of employment will remain anonymous during the trial
of this case, and that's the reason why you have been given numbers.
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number of courts have instructed anonymous jurors that their
identities were kept secret due to potential media interference
rather than fear of jury tampering by the defendant. 102 By
means of such instructions, judges imply that the jurors are not
being kept anonymous because of any reputation or threat of
misconduct on the part of the defendant, and that the jurors
should not feel as if they are being protected from the defendant.
Other curative instructions include a statement to the jurors
that anonymity is not an extraordinary measure but rather a
common procedure in the federal justice system. 10 3 Through this
method, courts hope to remove any stigma that might result
from the jurors' awareness that unusual measures are being
taken to protect their safety. Still other curative instructions at-
tempt to describe anonymity as a precautionary measure taken
to make sure both sides receive a fair and impartial trial, or to
allay any possible fears, whether founded or unfounded, that ju-
rors may have about serving on the jury. 104
Id. at 1365 n.1.
102 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1522 n.27 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing
court's jury instruction which stated that their anonymity was function of fair trial
rather than defendant's participation in violent activities toward witnesses); United
States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1193 (2d Cir. 1991) (instructing jury at outset of trial
that special precautions were designed to protect from media contact); United States v.
Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir. 1985) (attributing jury's anonymity to need to pro-
tect juror privacy and save them from embarrassment); United States v. Barnes, 604
F.2d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that court had chosen to maintain juror anonymity
to protect juror privacy and save them from embarrassment); United States v. Gambino,
809 F. Supp. 1061, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (instructing jury that special procedures are
routine and designed to protect jury from any contacts by media); United States v. Pasci-
uti, 803 F. Supp. 499, 503 n.5 (D.N.H. 1992) (borrowing Judge Pollack's instruction in
Thomas, ostensibly to minimize prejudicial effects on defendants).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (arguing
that selection of anonymous jury is common practice followed by federal courts); United
States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 801 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that selection of anonymous jury
is not unusual practice); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1133 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that common practice in federal courts to keep names and identities of jurors
secret).
104 See, e.g., Ross, 33 F.3d at 1522 n.27. The Ross court told the jurors that they had
been kept anonymous because:
I don't want the defendant to be characterized as someone who would be sending
anonymous communications to the jury, and I don't want the government to be char-
acterized as someone who is trying to influence the jury improperly.... It's not be-
ing done because of any apprehension on the part of this Court that you would have
been endangered or subject to improper pressures if your names had been dis-
closed.... The fact that you are anonymously selected is not in any way a reflection
on the defendant or the defense or anyone associated with the defense. It is simply a
precautionary measure to make sure both sides get a fair trial.
Id.; United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1217 (7th Cir. 1992). The court informed
the jury that anonymity "was one of a number of procedures used by the federal courts to
avoid any contact between the jurors and the parties to ensure that both sides receive a
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Curative instructions have been much criticized as erroneous
in their assumptions and lacking in true curative effect. 10 5 Ju-
rors who have been informed that they are in need of protection
or that their fears are being allayed, for example, will likely read
between the lines and conclude that the threat alluded to does
not come from the prosecutor, the defense attorney, the court of-
ficers or even from the court buffs in the third row. In a criminal
case, the defendant accused of the criminal acts is usually the
only party who would naturally be perceived as a threat. Cura-
tive instructions which attempt to alleviate the stigma against
the defendant by stating that third parties or the nature of the
case are to blame for the empanelment of an anonymous jury as-
sume a great deal of naivet6 on the part of the jurors. 106
Similarly, curative instructions which inform jurors that jury
anonymity is a common practice assume lack of knowledge on
the part of the jurors. In fact, this may well be an erroneous as-
sumption. Studies indicate that 16 to 29 percent of Americans
have served on juries. 107 In light of this figure, it is highly likely
that an anonymous jury panel will contain one or more people
who have previously served as jurors and can inform their fellow
jurors that anonymity is by no means a routine procedure. 108
fair and impartial determination by the members of the jury." Id.
105 See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1025-26 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding in fa-
vor of trial judge who informed jury of true reason for their anonymity was because case
dealt with organized crime).
106 See State v. Acetturo, 619 A-2d 272, 274 (N.J. 1992). "Jurors would not be so na-
ive as to believe that news media coverage would be a reason for their anonymity." Id. In
addition, the Barnes decision itself is "substantial evidence of how difficult it might have
been for the jurors to resist an inference as to the 'real' reason for the decisions regarding
juror names, addresses and sequestration." Barnes, 604 F.2d at 168 n.4 (Meskill, J., dis-
senting). The dissenting judge in Barnes noted that even though the trial judge had is-
sued a curative instruction that implied that the names of jurors were being withheld to
protect their privacy, the majority opinion in the Second Circuit focused almost entirely
upon juror safety and the potential of jury tampering. Id. Thus, on at least one occasion,
even judges have shown themselves capable of seeing through the deceptive nature of
curative instructions.
107 See Maura Dolan, Judging the Jury System, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al (16
percent); Ellen Goodman, Today's Juror Must Carry the Baggage of Evolving Values, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 21, 1994, at 13 (17 percent); Reynolds Holding, Unanimous Jury Rule is Un-
popular, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Sept. 12, 1995, at A13 (29 percent).
108 See Acetturo, 619 A.2d at 274. "Experience tells us... that in any given jury
panel, there will be some, perhaps many, persons who will have previously served on
criminal jury panels, and who, therefore, will wonder and speculate as to the matter of
anonymity." Id. Ironically, other courts have noted that the lack of curative instructions
can have the same effect on the jury panel. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Dupont, avail-
able in 1998 WL 559694, at *6 (Mass. Super. 1998). The identification of jurors by their
first names only "is an odd procedure that is likely to cause some prospective jurors to
assume that their last names are not being used so that the defendant will not hear
ANONYMOUS JURIES
Moreover, in many high-profile cases, the prosecution's motion
for an anonymous jury is itself given prominent media coverage.
For example, the federal prosecutor's motion for an anonymous
jury in the trial of five New York City police officers accused of
assaulting Haitian immigrant Abner Louima was covered in all
four New York City dailies, as well as on televised news pro-
grams. 10 9 This media coverage included a detailed analysis of
the true reasons why an anonymous jury was requested. 110 In
the face of such extensive publicity, it is likely that many pro-
spective jurors will be aware of the actual reasons for their ano-
nymity and will therefore not be deceived by curative instruc-
tions.
The most crucial problem of curative instructions, however, is
that they are often deceptive to the jury. In United States v.
Scarfo,111 the Third Circuit noted that unwarranted claims by
the trial judge as to possible media interference were deceptive
to the jury and therefore represented a potential danger to the
integrity of the criminal justice system. 112
Similarly, in New Jersey v. Acetturo,113 the court rejected the
State's assertion that the stigma to the defendant resulting from
the empanelment of an anonymous jury could be overcome by
means of curative instructions. The Acetturo court held that an
instruction to the jury stating that anonymity was a common
procedure or was exclusively a shield against media interference
was unacceptable because it would not be truthful. 114 Further-
more, the court added that jurors would quickly realize that such
a curative instruction was false and that the instruction would
inform them, albeit by innuendo, about the potential harm that
them," and that in the absence of a curative instruction it is "likely that such prospective
jurors may assume that the judge has some special knowledge about the defendant that
would justify such a security precaution." Id. at *12-13. Thus, both the presence and ab-
sence of curative instructions may lead to the same deleterious effect upon the presump-
tion of innocence, further demonstrating that the prejudice caused by anonymous juries
is in fact incurable.
109 See Christopher Francescani, Feds Rip Louima Cops' Private Eye, N.Y. POST,
Feb. 2, 1999, at 7; Fried, supra note 71, at B3; Patricia Hurtado, Anonymity Sought for
Louima Jury, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 1999, at A22; Helen Peterson, Feds Seek Anony-
mous Jurors for Louima Trial, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 2, 1999, at 8.
110 Seeid.
111 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1988).
112 See id. at 1025 (arguing need for judges to deal honestly with jurors).
113 619 A.2d 272 (N.J. 1992).
114 See id. at 274.
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might come to them as a result of the defendants, their associ-
ates, or their agents.11 5 As the Acetturo court correctly recog-
nized, it would threaten the very integrity of the American judi-
cial system if courts routinely lied to potential jurors.
C. Meaningful Voir Dire
Another deleterious effect of anonymous juries is their in-
fringement on the right of criminal defendants to make intelli-
gent use of their peremptory challenges. While the peremptory
challenge is not constitutionally mandated, 1 1 6 it is nevertheless
guaranteed by statute in both federal and state jurisdictions 117
and has been described as "one of the most important rights se-
cured to the accused."11 8
The peremptory challenge is both necessary and important be-
cause potential jurors' biases are often not readily discernible.
Rather, "[t]he public prosecutor (and, presumably, the defen-
dant) may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of
a juror offered, from his habits and associations, and yet find it
difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection to him. In
such cases, the peremptory challenge is a protection against his
being accepted."11 9 Thus, it is necessarily important that the
peremptory challenge continue to be an arbitrary and capricious
challenge that may be exercised on grounds normally thought ir-
relevant to legal proceedings.120
In keeping with this, courts have noted that "[t]he voir dire in
American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a
predicate for the exercise of peremptories" as well as challenges
115 See id. (proposing jurors would not believe media coverage as excuse for em-
panelment).
116 See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the
Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory
challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is se-
cured.").
117 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 170 (2d Cir. 1994) (Meskill, J., dis-
senting) (noting that Congress has chosen to grant right to peremptory challenge).
118 See id. (citing Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)); see also Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219 (1965) (holding that peremptory challenges are necessary
part of jury trial), overruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
119 Barnes, 604 F.2d at 170 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120
U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
120 See id. at 172 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis v. U.S., 146 U.S. 370, 376
(1892)).
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for cause. 12 1 It is well established that, since a statutory right to
peremptory challenges has been conferred by the legislature,
courts must grant "sufficient inquiry into surface information as
well as the background and attitudes of prospective jurors to en-
able them to exercise intelligently their peremptory chal-
lenges." 122
The importance of disclosure of names and addresses of poten-
tial jurors to the exercise of peremptory challenges may be illus-
trated by an analogous line of cases involving witnesses. In Al-
ford v. United States,123 the Supreme Court held that it was
reversible error to deny cross-examination as to the residence of
a witness, stating that one goal of cross-examination is that "the
witness may be identified with his community so that independ-
ent testimony may be sought and offered of his reputation for ve-
racity in his own neighborhood... and that facts may be brought
out tending to discredit the witness by showing that his testi-
mony in chief was untrue or biased."124 Similarly, in Smith v. Il-
linois,125 the Supreme Court held that, even though cross-
examination of a witness was not entirely foreclosed, it was re-
versible error to deny defense counsel the opportunity to ask his
true name and address. 126 Specifically, the court stated that
"when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting
point in 'exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth' through
cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he
is and where he lives. The witness' name and address open
countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court in-
vestigation." 127 Indeed, failure to allow such a fundamental in-
quiry essentially emasculates the right of cross-examination. 128
Jurors, of course, are not witnesses, and the right of confronta-
121 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965).
122 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 172 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (providing collective case
analyses); see also U.S. v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1295 (7th Cir. 1976).
123 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
124 See id. at 691-692 (allowing character to be introduced in order to impeach wit-
ness).
125 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
126 See id. at 132-134; see also Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687, 688 (1931) (holding that
questions about witness's place of residence should be allowed); People v. Smith, 69 Ill.
App.2d 83, 89 (1966) (holding that informer privilege does not apply when informant is
also witness).
127 Alford, 390 U.S. at 131.
128 See id. CTo forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to
emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.").
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tion and cross-examination does not apply to jurors. 129 Never-
theless, the juror credibility is analogously an issue. 130 The hid-
den bias of a juror, like that of a witness, may have a devastating
effect on a criminal or civil case. Thus, as with the cross-
examination of a witness, an attorney conducting voir dire must
be afforded the opportunity to explore any avenues which may
lead to the uncovering of bias or interest. 131 As with a witness,
"the very starting point.. .must necessarily be to ask the [poten-
tial juror] who he is and where he lives." Not only will this place
the potential juror in his community so that any possible bias
stemming from his surroundings may be examined, but the
knowledge of a venireperson's name and address will also pro-
vide attorneys with additional information which may be neces-
sary to them in evaluating the truthfulness of a jury panelist's
answers to other questions. 132
An example of the usefulness of jurors' names and addresses to
the exercise of peremptory challenges is provided by the Massa-
chusetts Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Dupont.133 The Dupont trial, which concerned a pharmacy rob-
bery, occurred soon after another pharmacy in a different neigh-
borhood had been robbed in a similar manner. 134 Thus, the court
found that the defendant's lack of knowledge of prospective ju-
rors' addresses handicapped him in determining whether any
members of the panel resided near this other pharmacy.135
Moreover, the court noted that the defendant could have used
129 See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 134-37 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding poten-
tial threats to jurors and witnesses sufficiently analogous that it cited several instances
of witness tampering to justify allowing anonymity for jurors).
130 See Alford, 390 U.S. at 131.
131 See King, supra note 9, at 147 n.98. Professor King argues that the disclosure of
names of potential jurors serves no legitimate purpose at the voir dire because such dis-
closure, at best, would only reveal the ethnicity of the panelist. Id. However, it is far from
settled law at the present time that the national origin or religion of a prospective juror,
as opposed to race or gender, are impermissible grounds upon which to based a peremp-
tory challenge. Id.; see also Abraham Abramovsky, Race, Religion and a Jury of One's
Peers, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1997, at 3. As long as ethnicity is a lawful ground upon which
an attorney may base a peremptory challenge, attorneys must be permitted to explore
this topic at voir dire.
132 As an example, an attorney's evaluation of the truthfulness of a potential juror's
statement that he is unfamiliar with a public park in which a crime took place might be
affected by the knowledge that the panelist resides across the street from the park,
rather than merely in the same county.
133 1998 WL 559694 (Mass. Super. 1998).
134 See id. at *6, *6 n.20, *15.
135 See id. at *6.
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the jurors' identities to screen out venirepersons who resided in
affluent neighborhoods or in the vicinity of other robberies in
which he had previously been a suspect. 136 Thus, juror anonym-
ity prevents a defendant from learning whether "[a] juror might
turn out to be related to a party or a witness (yet not disclose
this on voir dire) or to live in a neighborhood whose residents
have demographic characteristics predictive of their likely re-
sponse to the issues in the case."137 Rejecting prosecutors' argu-
ment that voir dire on these issues would be "irrelevant," the'
court stated that "so long as we have challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges... [the deprivation] of information essen-
tial to their exercise of a valued procedural right cannot be rated
as negligible."'138
Thus, the same factors which require inquiry into the names
and addresses of witnesses demand that the scope of inquiry at
the voir dire include the names, addresses and backgrounds of
potential jurors. As at least one jurist has noted, the institution
of the anonymous jury "strikes a Vermont judge as bizarre, al-
most Kafka-esque. It makes peremptory challenges for all prac-
tical purposes worthless."'139
D. Curtailment of Outside Investigation
The use of anonymous juries in fact curtails parties' examina-
tion of potential jurors in more than one way. Not only does
anonymity foreclose important lines of questioning at the voir
dire, but it also indirectly precludes outside investigation of
members of the jury panel. 140 Without the names and addresses
of potential jurors, prosecutors and defense attorneys are unable
to conduct independent investigation of panelists through law
enforcement, credit agencies and other sources of public informa-
tion. 14 1
136 See id.
137 Id. at*14.
138 Id.
139 United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 175 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
140 See id. at 172 n.7 (noting that independent investigation of jurors was impossible
because of their anonymity and express prohibition by trial judge).
141 See U.S. v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1958) (proceeding with govern-
ment investigation of tax records of panel members); see also United States v. Falange,
426 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1970) (investigating jurors with aid of F.B.I, local police and
credit bureaus).
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Outside investigation, like the voir dire, can be an important
means of ferreting out potential bias and corruption among ju-
rors. A panelist who has financial problems, for example, might
be potentially susceptible to bribery. Independent investigation
through law enforcement sources might reveal otherwise un-
known connections between potential jurors and defendants or
law enforcement, or bring to light other factors which might af-
fect a panelist's bias or interest in the outcome of the case. In
addition, the possibility of juror investigation may in fact deter
prospective jurors from misrepresenting facts that may poten-
tially disqualify them. 142
Moreover, this is one area where juror anonymity works
against prosecutors as well as defendants. Several cases illus-
trate the success and efficacy of investigation of potential jurors
by federal prosecutors with the aid of law enforcement agen-
cies. 143 In serious criminal cases, especially those involving or-
ganized crime, such investigation might reveal crucial informa-
tion about the potential for jury tampering. When anonymous
juries are utilized, prosecutors are foreclosed from conducting
this potentially vital inquiry.
The danger posed to prosecutors by anonymous juries is again
illustrated by the first federal trial of John Gotti.144 In that trial,
a juror with ties to an Irish-American organized crime group was
bribed by Gotti, resulting in an acquittal.145 At voir dire, the ju-
ror, George Pape, lied about this association with organized
crime. 146 If the federal prosecutors in that case had been able to
investigate his background, his potential for corruption might
142 See Barnes, 604 F.2d. at 173 ("These lists, and the investigations serve another
important function as well. They may deter prospective jurors from misrepresenting or
minimizing embarrassing or possibly disqualifying aspects of their backgrounds."); see
also Barbara A- Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "It's Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 547, 554 (1975) (discussing potential for honesty in investigating jury).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1970) (investigating
potential jurors through FBI and credit bureau records); United States v. Costello, 255
F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1958) (investigating jurors via tax returns); Best v. United
States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950) (using FBI reports); State v. Bessenecker, 404
N.W.2d 134, 135 (Iowa 1987) (investigating jurors through criminal records); Common-
wealth v. Cerveny, 367 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Mass. 1977) (utilizing probation records); Lo-
savio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Colo. 1972) (using criminal records); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 215 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Mass. 1966) (using police officer investigation of
potential jurors).
144 See U.S. v. Gotti, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993).
145 See CAPECI & MUSTAIN, supra note 68, at 173-75.
146 See id. at 173.
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have been unearthed prior to trial.147 Thus, far from insuring
that justice would be done, the empanelment of an anonymous
jury in the Gotti case might well have been responsible for de-
laying justice against Gotti for a further seven years. 148
E. The Tradition of Juror Accountability
At least one court has noted still another detrimental effect of
anonymous juries on the rights of the accused: Erosion of the
"tradition of identified jurors."1 49 The Massachusetts Superior
Court noted that the original American colonists "brought with
them a system in which a defendant in all types of criminal tri-
als traditionally had been tried by individuals whom the defen-
dant knew or, at least was highly likely to know."150 Moreover, a
verdict rendered by a jury of individuals known to the defendant
is personalized. 151
The damage done to this personification of justice is especially
great "[i]n modern urban society... [where] it is extraordinarily
unlikely that a defendant will be aware of the identities of the
prospective jurors if that information is withheld by the
court."1 52 Moreover, since the anonymity of urban life is not du-
plicated in rural areas, empanelment of anonymous juries will
effectively create a two-tier justice system in which rural defen-
dants will know the identities of the fellow citizens who judge
them while urban defendants will not. Thus, empanelment of
anonymous juries "undermines the shared values and practices
which constituted the common understanding of the drafters of
the Sixth Amendment." 153
147 For instance, Pape had appeared prior to the Gotti trial as a character witness in
deportation proceedings related to Bosko Radonjich. Radonjich was an organized crime
figure associated with the Westies, an Irish-American gang with ties to the Gambino
family. A thorough investigation by federal law enforcement authorities would likely
have uncovered this prior judicial appearance, and thus provided a reason to question
Pape's impartiality.
148 See King, supra note 9, at 149-51. Professor King argues that juror anonymity
"does not prevent the discovery of jury misconduct." Id. However, Professor King's argu-
ment focuses on juror misconduct during deliberations rather than corruption or un-
truthful responses at the voir dire. Id.
149 See Commonwealth v. Dupont, 1998 WL 559694, at *16 (Mass. Super. 1998).
150 See id.
151 See id. (citing United States v. Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1996)).
152 See Dupont, 1998 WL 559694, at *17.
153 Id. at *17, *17 n.40 (citing In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir.
1988)) (noting that "the anonymity of life in the cities has so changed the complexion of
this country that even the press, with its vast and imaginative methods of obtaining in-
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F. The Slippery Slope
As a final measure of caution in extending the use of anony-
mous juries, courts and legislatures should consider the path
down which such extension might lead. From its beginnings as a
one-time measure in an extraordinary case, the anonymous jury
has progressed to the point where its damaging effect on the pre-
sumption of innocence has been felt even by those accused of
misdemeanors. 154 If juror anonymity is accepted as a routine
measure, future courts might decide that the same issues of
safety and integrity which justify nameless juries might also jus-
tify allowing witnesses to testify anonymously. Already, in cer-
tain non-Article III tribunals, the government may prove its case
through sealed testimony from anonymous witnesses. 155 Such
testimony in a criminal prosecution would seem unthinkable un-
der present interpretations of the Sixth Amendment, but at one
time juror anonymity would have been regarded the same way.
Concern for safety might even override the Constitution to the
point where judges preside anonymously over trials. In coun-
tries such as Peru, which are or have been plagued by guerrilla
warfare and narcotics trafficking, many cases are tried by
masked judges presiding anonymously in specially constituted
courts. 156 Such abdication of judicial accountability is arguably
different only in degree from the empanelment of anonymous ju-
ries.
In sum, the arguments in favor of anonymous juries are coun-
terbalanced by equally compelling arguments against them. Not
only do nameless juries cause serious damage to the rights of
criminal defendants, but they also pose danger to prosecutors
and set the American justice system as a whole on a dangerous
path. 157 Courts and legislators should seriously consider these
formation, apparently does not know and cannot easily obtain the names of the jurors
and of the veniremen and women who did not serve in this case")
154 See Gewertz, supra note 57 (discussing California judge's use of anonymous juries
in misdemeanor cases).
155 See Paul B. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1141, 1163 (1984) (noting that alien in deportation hearing has no right to confrontation
because confidential files can be used by judge).
156 See Toni Marshall, Berenson Family Urges U.S. Pressure on Peru, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1998, at A17 (noting Peruvian system of "faceless" military tribunals); see also
King, supra note 9, at 140 (quoting trial judge as predicting that anonymous juries might
lead to anonymous judges).
157 See King, supra note 9, at 134 (arguing in favor of routine jury empanelment).
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factors in determining whether to allow or extend the use of
anonymous juries.
III. PEOPLE V. WATTS AND THE FUTURE OF ANONYMOUS JURIES
A recent trial court decision in Richmond County now raises
the possibility that New York, which has hitherto resisted the
empanelment of anonymous juries, may see its way clear to do-
ing so in the near future. The decision in People v. Watts158 is
especially significant in that it concluded that anonymous juries
were possible in New York despite the existence of a statutory
right to disclosure of the names of jury panelists. 159
This right stems from a combined application of two related
statutes, sections 270.15(1)(a) and 270.15(1-a) of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law. The first of these sections, enacted as
part of the original New York Criminal Procedure Law in
1970,160 provides in part that, if no challenge to the jury panel as
a whole is made at the opening of voir dire, "the court shall di-
rect that the names of not less than twelve members of the [jury]
panel be drawn and called as prescribed by the judiciary law."'161
The second of these statutes, enacted in 1983,162 allows courts to
restrict disclosure of the addresses of potential or sworn jurors to
counsel for either party for good cause. 163
Until recently, it was taken for granted among New York
criminal lawyers that CPL Section 270.15(1)(a) prohibited the
empanelment of anonymous juries. 164 In People v. Gotti,165 an
158 661 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1997). The defendant, Joseph Watts, was coinciden-
tally an associate of John Gotti, who seems to have made his primary contribution to so-
ciety in the form of assisting in the development of the law of anonymous juries. Id. at
769.
159 See id. at 771 (holding that where defendant is threat to jury, anonymity is per-
missible); see also Matter of Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 92 A.D. 2d 405, 460 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1983) (holding that defendant's intimidation of jury was reason for jury to
hear Grand Jury testimony); United States' Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Mo-
tion for an Anonymous and Partially Sequestered Jury in United States v. Volpe, CR-98-
196 (E.D.N.Y.), dated February 1, 1999, at 11 (noting that jury in 1997 trial in New York
County Supreme Court of alleged "cyber-rapist" Oliver Jovanovic was anonymous).
160 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 270.15(1)(a) (McKinney 1998).
161 Id.
162 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 270.15(1-a) (McKinney 1998).
163 See id.
164 See, e.g., Abramovsky, supra note 52, at 3 (noting that prohibition of anonymous
juries pursuant to CPL previously taken for granted); Jose Maldonado, Anonymous Ju-
ries: What's the Legislature Waiting For, 66 N.Y. ST. B. J. 40, 43 (1996) (noting proposed
amendment to CPL § 270.15 to allow for anonymous juries).
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unreported decision rendered during the New York State assault
trial of John Gotti, the trial court concurred in this analysis,
finding that the Criminal Procedure Law prohibited the use of
anonymous juries. 166 Indeed, the Gotti court did so without the
necessity for detailed conclusions of law, although it mentioned
that empanelment of an anonymous jury would not by itself vio-
late the United States or New York Constitution. 167
In 1997, however, the issue of anonymous juries in New York
was revisited by the Watts court. While the court in Watts
agreed that the New York State Criminal Procedure Law pro-
hibits selection of an anonymous jury168 and that criminal de-
fendants had a statutory right to disclosure of jurors' names, it
nevertheless held that this right might be forfeited under certain
circumstances. 16 9
The court began its analysis by finding that CPL Section
270.15(1)(a) indeed constituted a prohibition on anonymous ju-
ries. Despite the plain language of the statute, this outcome was
far from certain. The Massachusetts Supreme Court had held
that a statute similar to CPL Section 270.15(1)(a) created an in-
alienable right in certain criminal defendants to learn the names
and addresses of prospective jurors. 170 However, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii in State v. Samonte1 71 reached the opposite con-
clusion, finding that a Hawaiian statute requiring the names of
prospective jurors be called in open court was merely directory
165 Ind. No. 359/89 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. Dec. 15, 1989).
166 See id.
167 See id. The opinion of the Gotti court reads, in its entirety, as follows:
The People's motion for an anonymous jury is decided as follows. Although this court
believes that it is not violative of the New York State or federal Constitutions to em-
panel jurors whose names are not disclosed, the court finds that the procedure is
prohibited by the Criminal Procedure Law. The court grants a protective order, how-
ever, to preclude disclosure of the business and residential addresses of all prospec-
tive and sworn jurors (CPL 270.15, subd 1-a). A further written opinion elaborating
the findings of fact and conclusions of law will issue after the jury is selected.
Id. The record does not reflect that any "further written opinion" was ever rendered.
168 See Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (This Court agrees.. .that the Criminal Proce-
dure Law prohibits selection of an anonymous jury.").
169 See id. at 771 ("The constitutional right to confront a witness may be forfeited
through a defendant's act of witness intimidation .. "); see also Matter of Holtzman v.
Hellendbrand, 92 A.D.2d 405, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1983).
170 See Commonwealth v. Anguilo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 171 (Mass. 1988) (holding that
anonymous juries could not be empaneled in cases where defendants faced life sentences
because Massachusetts statute required that such defendants be provided with names of
prospective jurors).
171 928 P.2d 1 (Haw. 1996).
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rather than mandatory and could be set aside by the trial court if
necessary to protect the safety or integrity of the jury. 172
Turning aside the prosecution's contention that this statute
was merely a procedural rule, such as described in Samonte, the
Watts court noted that it must be read in combination with CPL
Section 270.15(1-a). 173 Specifically, the court held that:
[I]f CPL Section 270.15(1)(a) was only a procedural statute
regulating jury selection rather than also a statute creating
a right on behalf of the parties to know the identities of po-
tential jurors, then the 1983 enactment of CPL Section
270.15(1-a) would not have been necessary... [as] the Court
already would have possessed the inherent power to limit
access to jurors' addresses. 174
Rather, "if the Court needed the specific statutory authority
provided by CPL Section 270.15(1-a) to limit access to jurors' ad-
dresses, it is logically inconsistent to assert that the Court, nev-
ertheless, does not need specific statutory authority to override
the mandate. . . that jurors' names be called in open court during
jury selection."175 Moreover, the Watts court noted that during
the 1991-92 and 1993-94 sessions, the New York State Legisla-
ture failed to take action on proposed legislation to amend CPL
Section 270.15 to allow for anonymous juries in certain cases.176
Thus, even though the Criminal Procedure Law allows trial
courts the discretion to "limit the scope of voir dire to matters af-
fecting the qualifications of jurors,"177 it does not allow courts to
withhold jury panelists' names. 178
In a seemingly incongruous decision, however, the Watts court
held that the right to disclosure of jury panelists' names may be
forfeited by criminal defendants. 179 In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the court cited Matter of Holtzman v. Hellenbrand,180 in
which a defendant's right to confrontation was forfeited through
172 See id. at 11-15.
173 See Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 770-71.
174 Id. at 770.
175 See id.
176 See id. at 771.
177 See id. at 770 (citing text of N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 270.15(1)(c)).
178 See id. (finding that while jury empanelment is not violative of New York and
federal constitutions, such procedure is barred by Criminal Procedure Law).
179 See id. at 771.
180 92 A-D.2d 405 (2d Dep't 1983).
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his acts of witness intimidation,18 1 and Illinois v. Allen,18 2 in
which the Supreme Court held that a defendant forfeited his
constitutional right to be present at his own trial through dis-
ruptive behavior in the courtroom. 18 3 Thus, "by parity of rea-
soning, the statutory right to knowledge of jurors' names and
addresses may be forfeited by a defendant's acts warranting such
a result."184 Accordingly, "in cases where the acts of a defendant
represent a clear threat to either the safety or integrity of the
jury, the court may find under existing law that the defendant
has forfeited his statutory right to the jurors' names and ad-
dresses."'185 Notably, the Watts court reached this conclusion de-
spite the provision in CPL Section 270.15 (1-a) which states that
jurors' addresses must be disclosed to counsel where there is a
"likelihood" of jury tampering. 186
The court noted, however, that "unlike acts of witness intimi-
dation or courtroom disruption which may be evaluated after
those acts have occurred... a decision that a defendant has for-
feited the statutory right to know jurors' names and addresses
must, of necessity, be made prior to the jurors' names being
called."18 7 Rather, the only basis upon which a determination of
forfeiture could be made was "a prediction that jury tampering
will occur." 188 While the court held that prosecutors would "have
to present more than a mere possibility of jury tampering to jus-
tify a finding that the defendant has forfeited his right to jurors'
names and addresses,"189 it stated that "[a]legations of actual
181 See id. at 412-15 (holding that defendant's acts of witness intimidation forfeited
constitutional rights).
182 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
183 See id. at 342-43 (excluding defendant from courtroom based on defendant's dis-
ruptive behavior).
184 See Watts, 661 N.Y.S2d at 771; see also Newsday v. Sise, 71 N.Y.2d 146, 150
(1987) (denying media access to information about jury in order to protect jurors); People
v. Vega, 363 N.Y.S.2d 214, 220 (1974) (stating that court may issue protective order
regulating disclosure of business or residential address of prospective or sworn juror to
any person(s) other than counsel for either party for good cause).
185 See N.Y. CRIM PROC. § 270.15(i)(a).
186 See Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 771. It is not clear from the language of the Watts de-
cision whether the court differentiated between disclosure of jurors' names and addresses
to defendants and disclosure to their attorneys. Id.; see also Newsday v. Goodman, 159
A.D.2d 667, 669 (2d Dep't 1990).
187 Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
188 Id.; see also United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1116 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding
grand jury tampering charge sufficient to empanel trial jury); United States v. Ruggiero,
available in 1998 WL 23456, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
189 See Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 771-72.
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jury tampering... in other cases or allegations of plans to tam-
per with the jury in this case" would entitle prosecutors to a
hearing on the empanelment of an anonymous jury. 190
The Watts court, however, omitted a crucial aspect of its
analysis of the conditions under which a defendant may forfeit
his constitutional or statutory rights. In both of the cases cited
in Watts, the conduct which resulted in forfeiture was particular
to the case in which the forfeiture occurred. In Holtzman, for in-
stance, the defendant forfeited his right to confrontation only as
to the witness he intimidated, not as to all witnesses. 191 Like-
wise, it would be incorrect to argue that the behavior of the de-
fendant in Allen could justify a court barring his presence at a
trial other than the one in which he disrupted the proceedings.
Thus, "by parity of reasoning," a defendant should not be held to
have forfeited his statutory right to knowledge of jurors' names
and addresses unless evidence exists that he might attempt to
engage in jury tampering in the case at bar.
This rule should apply despite the fact that a determination of
whether a defendant has forfeited his right to disclosure must be
made prior to any actual tampering. In those cases where jury
tampering is most likely to occur, namely, narcotics and organ-
ized crime prosecutions, prosecutors have ample access to paid
informants who can often provide warning of any plans to tam-
per with the jury. 192 If such plans come to light, a defendant's
past acts of jury tampering will be relevant and probative evi-
dence which may be introduced at the forfeiture hearing. Such
past acts alone, however, should not justify the empanelment of
an anonymous jury without a credible threat of tampering in the
case on trial. The damage which may be done to the rights and
interests of both the defendant and prosecutor is too great to
permit any lesser standard.
190 Id. The Watts court declined to empanel an anonymous jury under this standard,
noting that the prosecution had submitted no allegations that Watts actually tampered
with a jury or attempted to do so. Id. The District Attorney's mere allegation that Watts
had "claimed the ability to tamper with another jury" was not enough to support a forfei-
ture hearing. Id.
191 See Matter of Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 92 A.D.2d 405, 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1983).
192 HOWARD BLUM, GANGLAND: HOW THE FBI BROKE THE MOB 179-90 (1993) (noting
that FBI had knowledge of possible jury tampering during John Gotti's first federal trial,
although they did not disclose knowledge to prosecutors for security reasons); see also
Watts, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 771 ('[The access the People apparently have to informants
... .11).
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CONCLUSION
The presumption of innocence, once among the most hallowed
principles of the American judicial system, is increasingly men-
tioned only in dissenting opinions. So, too, has the right of the
accused to a meaningful voir dire and the exercise of peremptory
challenges. A time has come for reflection, however, when legal
scholars seriously advocate that the presumption of innocence -
and other rights of the accused which are of similar importance -
are regarded as secondary to "juror stress."193
Anonymous juries must be recognized for what they are - an
evisceration of criminal defendants' right to be presumed inno-
cent and to investigate jurors for potential bias. As such, there
is only one legitimate reason to withhold the names of jurors -
that is, to protect the integrity of the jury system from a threat
specific to a particular case. Certain steps to alleviate the stress
of jury service may be appropriate, but not measures which in-
fringe on rights of constitutional magnitude.
Courts must also differentiate between cases where the integ-
rity of the jury is threatened by outside forces such as the media,
and cases where the danger to the jury stems from actions of the
defendants. In high-profile cases where publicity is the major
concern, measures short of anonymity can be used to protect the
jurors from harassment without compromising the rights of the
parties. One such method is illustrated in Gannett, Inc. v. Dela-
ware,194 a criminal case in which the trial court ordered that the
names of jurors be released to the parties' attorneys and not the
media or the public. 195 In upholding this procedure, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court stated:
[The persons most involved - the trial judge, the defendant
and the State - were provided with the jurors' names and
other information. We cannot say that the appearance of
193 If the stressful effects of the judicial process are a legitimate reason to burden the
presumption of innocence, the courts may wish to alleviate such stress simply by elimi-
nating trials. If this were done, juror stress would not only be reduced but eliminated, as
there would be no further need for juries. Judicial stress, as well, would be drastically
eased due to the less congested court calendar. Prosecutors, whose role would be simpli-
fied to bargaining over sentences, would also lead much less stressful lives. Even defense
attorneys would not suffer as much stress as they do in the present system, as the out-
come of their cases would now be certain.
194 571 A.2d 735 (Del. 1990).
195 See id. at 737, 750.
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fairness would have been significantly enhanced by an-
nouncement of jurors' names in such a highly publicized set-
ting. 196
The Delaware compromise, releasing jurors' names and ad-
dresses to parties only coupled with a gag order preventing their
further dissemination, is specifically provided for by statute in
New York,19 7 and has been sanctioned in at least one high-
profile case by a New York appellate court.198 Such a compro-
mise would allow the prosecution and defense to conduct a
meaningful voir dire, and permit jurors to conduct their delibera-
tions free from both media harassment and the distracting ef-
fects of anonymity.
Even in cases where the threat of jury tampering emanates
from the defendants' conduct, anonymity should be used only as
a measure of last resort. It is hoped that New York's higher
courts will decline to adopt the holding of Watts, and preclude
anonymous juries outright. If such juries are allowed, empanel-
ment of a nameless jury should be permitted only if there is
credible evidence that one or more defendants intend to engage
in jury tampering, and then only after a hearing at which the
prosecution carries the burden of proof. Moreover, the prosecu-
tor should be required to prove that there is a realistic threat of
jury tampering in the case at bar, rather than any past or re-
lated case. If at all possible, the court should also consider less
restrictive means of protecting the integrity of the jury, such as
releasing names and addresses of potential jurors to counsel in
camera while forbidding their disclosure to the defendants them-
selves, or prohibiting any outside investigation of members of the
jury panel. 199 Only if the safety or integrity of the jurors can be
protected by no other means should the court empanel an
anonymous jury.200
196 Id. at 750.
197 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 270.15(1-a).
198 See, e.g., Newsday v. Goodman, 159 A.D.2d 667 (2d Dep't 1990).
199 See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 175 (Oakes, J., dissenting from denial of petition for re-
hearing en banc); see also Gold v. U.S., 378 F.2d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 1967) (refusing to al-
low questions in voir dire pertaining to potential jurors' religions).
200 See Abraham Abramovsky, Fraudulently Obtained Acquittals and Double Jeop-
ardy, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 13, 1996, at 3. As an alternative means of preventing and combatingjury tampering, courts might also hold that a defendant forfeits his protection from dou-
ble jeopardy if he obtains an acquittal through jury tampering. Id. This option has the
advantage of being reserved for instances where jury tampering actually takes place,
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Juror anonymity, like many other recent innovations in the
criminal justice system, is a solution which has spread far be-
yond the problem it was intended to solve. If New York courts
choose to empanel anonymous juries at all, they should do so
only where exigent circumstances are proven and where no other
measure will suffice. Thus, defendants and prosecutors will con-
tinue to have the widest possible latitude in selecting an impar-
tial jury - and jurors will continue to deliberate in an atmosphere
which does not threaten their impartiality.
rather than being based merely on speculation that jury tampering might occur. Id. This
remedy will be a strong deterrent against tampering with juries, as a defendant who does
so will risk giving the prosecution a second opportunity to convict him. Id. Moreover, this
measure would be a legitimate exercise of the forfeiture doctrine, as it would be based on
proven conduct which is particular to the case at bar. Id.
